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Abstract

Our research fleshes out econometric details of examining possible social interactions in
labor supply. We look for a response of a person's hours worked to hours worked in the
labor market reference group, which includes those with similar age, family structure,
and location. We identify endogenous spillovers by instrumenting average hours worked
in the reference group with hours worked in neighboring reference groups. Estimates of
the canonical labor supply model indicate positive economically important spillovers for
adult men. The estimated total wage elasticity of labor supply is 0.22, where 0.08 is the
exogenous wage change effect and 0.14 is the social interactions effect. We demonstrate
how ignoring or incorrectly considering social interactions can mis-estimate the labor
supply response of tax reform by as much as 60 percent.
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1. Introduction
Social interactions, defined as a response of individuals to the actions of people
with whom they interact, may have a biological basis or stem from information gathering.
Social interactions are a potentially important aspect of economic behavior because
interdependencies can affect the behavioral responses of people to the expected and
unexpected changes in their environment, including ones caused by public policy. We
investigate the econometric nuances and empirical importance of social interactions in
labor supply with taxes where the interdependence is a response of the individual to the
hours worked by the members of a reference group. We find evidence of a positive
spillover effect in hours worked that is important for tax policy, and show how ignoring
or misinterpreting labor supply social interactions effects can lead to substantial under or
overestimates of the labor supply effects of tax reforms.
There is wide-ranging evidence that people in close proximity may have a
significant effect on the individual's decisions. Researchers have identified the presence
of interdependence in the decisions of giving (Andreoni and Scholz 1998), voting
(Schram and Sonnemans 1996), consumption (Sen et al. 2001, Childers and Rao 1992,
Abu-Ismail 1992), crime (Glaeser et al. 1996), and health (Eibner and Evans 2005).
Interdependent behavior may also present be in labor markets. There has been interest in
social interactions in the female labor supply (Woittiez and Kapteyn 1998), young men’s
labor supply (Weinberg et al. 2004), male labor supply with taxes (Aronsson et al. 1999),
retirement (Hamermesh and Slemrod 2005), and job satisfaction (Hamermesh 1977,
2001).
Along with evidence of social interactions, there is an equally vast literature

showing that the interdependence is either economically insignificant, non-existent, or
econometrically fragile. For example, studies point out the importance of the reference
group choice when studying teenage behavior (Kooreman and Soetevent 2002),
cohabiting (Jacques and Chason 1978), and workplace interactions (Baker et al. 1968).
The selection of the instrumental variables to identify social interactions can also
dramatically change the results (Evans, Oates, and Schwab 1992).
The variety of interdependence studies and their conflicting conclusions underline
that identification of social interactions is econometrically complex (Soetevent 2006).
The first challenge a researcher needs to confront is what is the correct reference group
(Durlauf 2004). The reference group identity issue is largely ignored due to complexity,
with a notable exception by Woittiez and Kapteyn (1998) and Sun (2005).
The second challenge emerges because interdependence means that people
respond to the behavior of others in their reference group, so we should observe
correlated behaviors in neighborhoods, regions, or cities. However, there are other
reasons why we may observe correlated behavior; without additional information it is
impossible to distinguish endogenous effects from exogenous or contextual effects
(Manski 1993).
The benefits of empirical social interactions research are that once the researcher
identifies any interdependence one can perform a more complete welfare analysis. Policy
oriented economic models can relate social interactions to health outcomes (Deaton
2001), measurement of poverty (Pradhan 2001), or effects of taxes (Aronsson et al. 1999,
Abel 2005). Studies suggest that improving the situation of the neighborhoods, or
movement of individuals between neighborhoods can greatly affect the social welfare in
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the local communities. A recent issue of the Journal of Applied Econometrics (Special
Issue: Empirical Analysis of Social Interactions, 2003, September/October, Vol. 18, No.
5) also presents recent applications to peer effects in colleges, social interactions in
housing demand, and interdependence in worker's productivity.
Here we address many of the practical issues related to identifying the effect of
endogenous social interactions on an individual's actions. We create a flexible measure of
the economic distance approximating the level at which individuals interact among one
another. We define the economic distance between individuals as a combination of
personal characteristics and physical distance. Our measure reflects the varying costs of
interaction as higher economic distance implies higher cost of interaction, which implies
a lower level of interaction. We then define the reference groups, each of which consists
of persons who are in a close economic proximity, and compute hours worked for each
person in the reference group (endogenous social interactions). We create an instrument
from the mean of hours worked for persons who are in the adjacent reference group to
instrument endogenous social interactions. The specification lets us examine the core
issue of whether the hours supplied by persons in close economic proximity are related.
To frame the importance of social interactions we purposely use Panel Study of
Income Dynamics data from 1976 to anchor our research to the seminal cross-section
studies of male labor supply by Hausman (1981) and MaCurdy et al. (1990). Econometric
results suggest positive and non-negligible social interactions in hours worked. The total
wage elasticity of labor supply is 0.22, where about one-third (0.08) is due the exogenous
wage change and about two-thirds (0.14) is due to social interaction synergies. We
demonstrate how improperly accounting for social interactions can lead to mis-estimation
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of the labor supply effects of tax reform by ±60 percent.

2. Theory
Theories of social interactions have a long history in the economic literature.
Since Becker (1974), the evolution of economic theory includes developing many forms
of interactions: social norms (Lindbeck, Nyberg, and Weibull 1999), peer-group effects
(de Bartolome Charles 1990), neighborhood effects (Durlauf 1996), conformity effects
(Bernheim 1994), herding (Smith and Sorensen 2000), spillovers (Roback 1982),
contagion (Rigobon 2001), social capital (Glaeser et al. 2002, Becker and Murphy 2000),
and positional goods (Frank 1985). In most cases the method differs according to the
application, from an overlapping generations framework to a Bayesian learning model.
Theoretical exercises share the common feature that the utility of the individual is
somehow affected by either utility or choices made by members of the reference group,
who are people with whom the individual interacts.
In our theoretical framework we follow Brock and Durlauf (1995) and Grodner
and Kniesner (2006) who introduce interactions into a baseline model with additive total
utility consisting of individual utility and social utility. We assume that the economy is in
an equilibrium developed neighborhood structure (Durlauf 1996). In what follows we use
the terms membership group, neighborhood, and community as equivalent and meaning
persons who are part of the individual's reference group.
Consider now a general utility function that includes a negative spillover effect
for others’ hours worked:
Vig (cig , hig ; bg (μ h )) = uig (cig , T − hig ) − bg (μ hg ) s (hig )
st. cig ≤ hig wg ,
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(1)

where Vig (•) represents total utility of person i who belongs to the reference group g ,
u (•) represents a private utility over consumption (c) and leisure (T – h), where T is total

available time, h is hours worked/labor supplied, and ⎡⎣ −bg ( μh ) s ( hig ) ⎤⎦ is total social
disutility of working. Unlike the canonical utility function, total disutility of hours
worked depends on the level of bg ( • ) , which represents the importance of social
disutility. For the individual i in reference group g, bg (•) is increasing in average hours
worked in the reference group, μhg , excluding the ith worker (so μhg = h( − i ) g ), with

bg (0) = 0 , bg ( ∞ ) → ∞ , and bg′ > 0 . Total social disutility also depends on s ( • ) , which is
the social disutility of individual hours worked (disutility of the individual from how
others judge his or her work level) with s ( 0 ) = s0 > 0 , s ( ∞ ) → 0 , s′ < 0 , and s′′ > 0 ; s0
is autonomous social disutility, which is equal across individuals and reference groups.
Finally, wg is a wage rate in the reference group g .
Social disutility of individual's hours worked s ( • ) is always non-zero with a
maximum value s0 at zero hours worked.1 Social disutility of ones hours worked seems
most likely to be decreasing ( s′ < 0 ) at a decreasing rate ( s′′ > 0 ) . The decrease in the
social disutility means that as individuals work more hours they believe others judge
them less harshly. A decrease of social disutility at a decreasing rate means that as
individuals work more hours the gain of appearing better in the eyes of peers is getting
smaller. The worker may also view certain levels of hours worked as satisfactory and
care less and less about opinions of others as long as the worker reaches some accepted
levels of hours worked according to his or her personal belief system.2
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A typical maintained hypothesis is that the importance of the social utility term,
b , is increasing in the average hours worked in the individual's reference group (bg′ < 0) .

So, when workers see that the environment is filled with other hard-working people they
expect to be judged more if they stick out more relative to the labor market performance
of others. The individual may feel more negatively perceived if further down the ranking
of work effort.
After setting up the Lagrangian, taking the total differential of the first-order
conditions of (1), and performing comparative statics based on the properties of social
interactions in labor supply just described, the result emerging is that
( +) ( −)

}}
dh
− b′ s′
=
>0
d μh bs′′ ( h )+ 2wuch − uhh − w2ucc
42444
3
123 144

(2)

(+)

(+)

with the partial derivatives of private utility, ucc < 0 and uhh < 0 .
In equation (2) an increase in average hours worked in the reference group
increases the individual’s hours worked. The intuition is that when the average labor
supply increases the parameter b increases, social disutility increases, and total utility
decreases. To find a new maximum total utility the worker increases hours worked;
although utility decreases because hours worked are a bad ( uh < 0 ), an increase in the
labor supply reduces social disutility because s′ < 0 . Overall, an increase in hours worked
increases total utility because the decrease in social disutility is higher than the decrease
in individual utility. The model suggests that workers who are in an environment with a
relatively many hard working people are induced to work more hours than when there is
no social interactions effect.
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The utility function uig (cig , hig ; μhg ) = [(hig − b) / β ]exp − [1 + β (cig + s% ) /(b − hig )] ,
where b = α / β , s% = ( s / β − (α / β 2 ) , α and β are parameters, and s is a linear

combination of reference group variables ( μhg ), is the utility function derived by
Hausman (1980, 1981) amended to include social interactions. We will use the resulting
linear labor supply function when examining the hypothesis that there are social
interactions present in labor supply. In the empirical work to follow we regress
individuals’ hours worked on average hours worked in their reference groups, cet. par. A
positive coefficient on labor supplied by the reference group indicates the presence of a
positive spillover effect in hours worked (Woittiez and Kapteyn 1999, Aronsson et al
1999). We now flesh out the econometric details involved with examining social
interactions in individual labor supply.

3. Econometric Model
The canonical linear labor supply model with social interactions we estimate is
h = θ + αω + βυ + γ x + δ1h( − i ) g + δ 2 x( −i ) g + ε ,

(3)

where ω is the after-tax real wage, υ is after-tax virtual income, x is a vector of individual
control covariates, h( −i ) g is reference group average labor supplied, x( − i ) g is the vector of
control covariate averages for the reference group, ε is the error term, and [θ, α, β, γ, ρ,

δ1, δ2] are parameters to estimate.
3.1 Independent Variables

The net wage rate ( ω ) uses a marginal tax rate τ provided by the PSID, and is

ω = (1 − τ )w . Virtual income ( υ ) also uses the marginal tax rate from the PSID.3 To
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control for possible endogeneity when estimating (3) we instrument both the after tax
wage and virtual income using last year's gross wage and non-labor income (Ziliak and
Kniesner 1999).
The control covariates in labor supply include number of children less than six
years old, family size, an indicator if the person is more than 45 years old, the equity the
family has in their house, an indicator of a physical or nervous condition that limits the
amount of work, and hours worked in the previous year in some specifications to control
for individual heterogeneity in the cross-section. The control covariates are standard
exogenous explanatory variables in labor supply studies.
3.2 Social Interactions Variables

The mean for hours worked in the reference group is the sample average of hours
worked for other people who are close in economic distance to the worker. In the
computing the average we exclude the individual for whom we are computing a reference
group mean outcome. The estimated value of the parameter δ1 represents the effect of
endogenous social interactions in hours worked.
Computing the mean of covariates takes multiple steps. First we create a proxy
variable summarizing the information in the exogenous covariates. We then use factor
analysis and take the first factor as a proxy variable for exogenous information. The new
variable does not have a direct interpretation because it is standardized to have zero mean
and unit variance, however it is highly correlated with all the exogenous variables as well
as the individual’s hours worked. The mean in the reference group for the created proxy
variable uses the same range of the economic distance variables as used for computing
mean hours worked, again excluding the person for whom we are computing the
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reference group mean. The proxy variable controls for the common characteristics of the
reference group, and the estimated coefficient δ 2 indicates any presence of exogenous
social interactions.
3.3 Identifying Social Interactions

The form of the labor supply equation in (3) can identify the presence of both
endogenous (in the dependent variable) and exogenous (in the independent variables)
social interactions. Identification requires some additional structure, though (Manski
1993, Moffitt 2001).
If the reference groups are completely separable then a randomly distributed
shock that affects hours worked for some individuals and not others can help identify
endogenous social interactions (Moffitt 2001). When reference groups overlap there are a
variety of empirical approaches including repeated samples (Aronsson et al. 1999),
structural models (Brock and Durlauf 2002, Kapteyn et al. 1997, Krauth forthcoming),
aggregated data (Glaeser et al. 2002), within versus between variation (Graham and Hahn
2005), or spatial econometric techniques (Kelejian and Prucha 1998).
Alternatively, suppose there are workers who belong to more than one reference
group, and one uses them to compute the (endogenous) mean for reference group hours
worked. Hours worked by people in the adjacent reference group can now be an
instrument; this is similar to using past values of the dependent variable in a dynamic
panel data model (Arellano and Bond 1991). Here we use as an instrument the mean for
workers in the adjacent reference groups, which are defined by a social grid with two
social coordinates from factor analysis. The instrument is correlated with mean hours
worked in the individual’s reference group (endogenous social interactions) because
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people in the specific reference group and the adjacent reference group belong to the
same economic neighborhood. The instrument should also be uncorrelated with
unobservables affecting individual labor supply because the particular individual does not
belong to the adjacent reference group.4
Figure 1 illustrates our particular identification strategy. We present the
hypothetical two-dimensional social coordinate space with two reference groups: g1 and
g 2 . Suppose now that individual hg01 belongs to the reference group g1 and responds to
the outcomes of the members of the reference group, represented by the observations
labeled as hg1 1 and hg21g2 (empty and gray-filled circles). If we use the mean of all hg1 1 and
hg21g2 observations (referred further as hg(1−0) ) as an independent variable in the regression
(3) to try to identify endogenous social interaction in hg01 the coefficient will be biased
because observations hg1 1 and hg21g2 are also affected by the outcome hg01 , which causes
endogeneity in the hg(1−0) . However, if there are observations in the reference group g1 that
also belong to the neighboring reference group g 2 , then part of hg(1−0) attributed to the
outcomes hg21g2 can be instrumented by the outcomes of the members of the reference
group g 2 , denoted by hg3 2 . We can use instrumental variables (IV) estimation because
hg3 2 are correlated with all hg21g2 observations because they belong to the same reference
group, and hg3 2 are not correlated with the error terms associated with either hg01 or hg1 1
observations because they do not belong to the same reference group. Observations hg3 2
are transitorily correlated with the outcomes hg01 and hg1 1 only through the deterministic
part of observations hg21g2 .
10

In practice, if we instrument observations hg21g2 with outcomes hg3 2 there may still
be observations hg1 1 that are not instrumented and thus will make a part of the hg(1−0)
endogenous, which is the case presented in Figure 1. Instead of using just one reference
group we can imagine using a full set of observations in the adjacent reference groups
that form the ring around the particular reference group (represented by the dotted circle).

4. Data
We use data from the University of Michigan's Panel Study of Income Dynamics
(PSID) collected in years 1975 and 1976 (PSID Wave IX). One reason for using the PSID
is that it is the most frequently used data to study U.S. labor supply (Blundell and
MaCurdy 1999, Ziliak and Kniesner 1999). We purposely choose the 1976 cross-section
of the PSID data because we seek to understand how social interactions may effect labor
supply by anchoring our estimates to the influential research of Hausman (1980, 1981)
and MaCurdy et al. (1990) who use the same data to examine how taxes affect labor
supply.
4.1 Sample

We follow the sample selection process described in Eklöf and Sacklén (2000)
who compare the studies by Hausman (1981) and MaCurdy et al. (1990) to which we
anchor our research. Both studies estimate an almost identical linear labor supply model
with income taxation. We select observations according to the following criteria: married
males 26–55 years old with positive hours worked in 1974 and 1975 (but no higher than
5096 annual hours), who are heads of households in the cross-sectional random subsample; there were no changes in the family composition of the head or wife (others can
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change) in years 1974–1975; the head is not retired, permanently disabled, housewife,
student, or other; the household resides in the United States; and the head is not selfemployed or a farmer. Using our exclusion criteria for the 1976 PSID we obtain 1077
observations, which is close to the Hausman sample of 1084 and the MaCurdy sample of
1018 as reported by Eklöf and Sacklén (2000).5
4.2 Individual Regression Variables

The wage rate comes from a direct question in the PSID, including an imputed
value for workers who are not paid by the hour. We also estimate a wage equation to
impute hourly wages for observations with unobserved or truncated wages. In particular,
we use observations that have positive and not top-coded wage rates (839 observations)
to estimate a Tobit regression that uses as the dependent variable observed (un)truncated
wages on a constant term, age, age squared, years of schooling, years of schooling
squared, college degree, and family size. We then use the estimated wage equation to
produce a fitted value for all wages. The procedure is similar to that in Hausman (1981),
and so our mean hourly wage is $6.17, which nearly identical to the $6.18 reported by
Hausman.
Hours worked, the dependent variable, also comes from a directly asked question
in the PSID. Non-labor income is a constructed variable that is the difference between
total 1975 taxable income of the husband and wife and total 1975 labor earnings of the
husband. The hours worked and the non-labor income measures we use are also those of
MaCurdy et al. (1990). Other independent variables include number of children less than
six years old (KIDSU6), family size (FAMSIZ), an indicator variable for individuals
more than 45 years old (AGE45), the amount of equity the family had in its house
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(HOUSEQ), and an indicator of a physical or nervous condition that limited the amount
of work the respondent could do (BHLTH). Appendix A presents descriptive statistics for
all regression variables.
4.3 Reference Group and Economic Distance

Specifying the composition of the individual's reference group is the researcher’s
central decision in any study of interdependence (Manski 1993, 2001). Implementing the
reference group concept means acknowledging that people who are in relative proximity
to each other may interact with one another because the cost of interactions is low. We
use the concept of economic distance among individuals as an indicator of the potential
significance and magnitude of workers’ interdependencies (Conley 1999). We take
people who are in close economic distance as belonging to the same reference group.
Economic distance is a combination of whether the workers are similar
demographically and live in close physical proximity. We use a combination of personal
and family characteristics to define demographically similar persons and use the distance
between centers of counties in which people reside for their relative geographic locations.
There are multiple difficulties involved with selecting from a large variety of
characteristics to measure economic distance. Acknowledging that each characteristic
measure has a difference scale, and determining the relative importance of each input
variable on economic distance, we use a statistical model of factor analysis (Woittiez and
Kapteyn 1998). The factor analytic model deals naturally with characteristics having
different measurement scales; the procedure standardizes individual variables then fits a
linear model to find common latent variables called factors (Bai and Ng 2002, Bai 2003).
The intuition is that there are unobservable variables (factors) that are orthogonal to one
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another and that are strongly correlated with observed variables. We use the factors as
social coordinates to establish reference groups.
Because the typical variables explaining labor supply can affect whether workers
interact with each other by being related to economic distance, our factor analysis inputs
all independent variables from the econometric labor supply model (3). We also use
physical coordinates indicating the location by the center of the county where the person
resides. We use two factors to summarize demographic and physical coordinates because
there is usually a much better fit with multiple factors than with only one factor, but using
too many factors tends to be uninformative.6 By using two factors we have the
convenient feature that the computed latent variables serve as two social coordinates
(SocCoord1, SocCoord2) for where individuals are located on a social interactions grid
with economic distance measured by Euclidean distance between two points.

5. Empirical Results: Labor Supply with Social Interactions
Because in our study there is no clearly defined reference group we first select
persons likely to have interdependent labor supplies by using the two social coordinates
to define overlapping neighborhoods. The reference group now defined, we then estimate
the labor supply model in (3) using instrumental variables for identification. Finally, we
interpret the social interactions effects in terms of endogenous versus exogenous wage
effects.
5.1 Selecting the Reference Group

Because we do not have direct information on who belongs to the reference group
for a particular person we use a statistical procedure to infer it from the location and
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characteristics of the group’s members. We believe that our observations are
representative for working married men in terms of their individual characteristics and
spatial distribution.
We can think of the reference group as a ring of certain radius centered around the
individual in two-dimensional social coordinate space (Figure 1). The problem is then to
select the radius best representing the borders of the reference group. The borders
selection problem is key because we use sample observations to compute the
characteristics of close-by individuals. Each observation establishes possible multiple
reference groups so that careful selection of borders is critical here for identification.
To find borders for the membership groups we use a result from spatial
econometrics that as the reference group size expands the coefficient on endogenous
social interactions tends to minus infinity (Kelejian and Prucha 2002).7 In our application
endogenous social interactions are represented by the mean of hours worked by others in
the worker's reference group, AnnHSRG_0_R, where R indicates the radius dimension of
the reference group’s circle. If there are social interactions present at a certain size of the
reference group, then the upward bias because of reference group labor supply
endogeneity will overcome the statistical tendency for δˆ1 in (3) to become negative as the
neighborhood size increases, (Anselin 1988). The reference group with the most positive

δˆ1 in exploratory estimates of (3) then reveals the size of the worker’s reference group.
In Table 1 we present results from baseline labor supply regressions with a social
interactions variable, AnnHSRG_0_R. Estimation starts with R = 1, which means that the
average of hours worked uses nearby workers in the social space within the distance of
0.1 or less. When the indicator R = 1 the reference group has around 13 workers. As the
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size of the reference group increases in the social space (the radius indicator R increases),
the number of persons who are considered to be economically close to a worker increases
from 44 to about 271 in Table 1.
As expected a priori, the coefficient on average hours worked by neighboring
persons is increasingly negative across the columns of Table 1, going from about −0.2 to
−1.5 as the reference group size increases. Such a tendency will be observed for any
estimator including the IV regressions of Table 1 (Kelejian and Prucha, 2002). Critical to
our research is that the reference group labor supply coefficient becomes positive at the
size of the reference group where radius indicator R = 2.
The importance of Table 1 is that the pattern of regressions reveals the group size
with the largest upward bias due to endogeneity of the AnnHSRG variable. The
endogeneity caused by labor supply interdependencies is most positive for the range
(0,0.2), so we pick 0.2 as the radius most closely capturing the true size of the reference
group. Results from a Moran I test (Anselin 2001, p. 323) confirm the presence of social
interactions in hours worked and that the radius we adopt to define the reference group is
reasonable. The practical consequence of our specification search is it indicates that the
reference group contains about 44 persons, which means that it is small enough to
guarantee sufficient variation across groups but large enough so that the computed
average hours worked are meaningful and have relatively small error due to aggregation.
5.2 Social interactions Effects

The focus of our research is on examining interdependence in hours worked using
the canonical model of labor supply applied to cross-section data. This anchors our
results for purposes of interpretation to the influential labor supply research of Hausman
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(1980, 1981) and MaCurdy et al. (1990).
We first confirm that our estimates for the uncompensated wage and income
elasticities are similar to the results of Hausman and MaCurdy et al. The first column of
Table 2 presents IV regression wage and income coefficients for their canonical models
of labor supply. The uncompensated wage elasticity at the means is 0.14 and the income
elasticity at the means is −.008; both values are typical estimates in the econometric labor
supply literature that serves as our starting point for judging the importance of social
interactions.
Our focal regression results are presented in column two of Table 2, where we
add past hours worked as a simple control for additional person-specific heterogeneity
and hours worked in the reference group as reflecting social interactions. We also use as a
regressor the average of the proxy variable for the exogenous variables constructed via
factor analysis (IndVORG_2_6). The estimated social interactions effect is that a 10
hours increase in the reference group labor supplied would increase individual's hours
worked by about 6 hours. The estimated social interaction effect in column two of Table
2 is significant statistically and economically reasonable in magnitude.8
It is important to re-emphasize that the estimated social interactions effect, δˆ1 ,
which is the impact of average hours worked by persons in the worker's reference group
(AnnHSRG_0_2), has the expected sign and magnitude only after the interdependence
has been instrumented, which we do in Table 2. The results in Table 1 are inconsistent
because they suggest the presence of endogenous social interactions (Durbin-WuHausman test rejects exogeneity at the 5 percent level). Because of the difference
between the results in Tables 1 and 2 we need to emphasize the method we use to
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construct the instrument for social interactions in labor supply.
As noted, there are no obvious variables to provide exogenous variation with
which to instrument reference group work effort, so we use the structure of the data to
construct an instrument for the reference group’s labor supplied. Taking reference groups
as overlapping with boundaries as fixed, average hours worked by persons in the adjacent
reference groups can be instruments. The outer boundary of the persons for the
instrument group will be exactly twice the size of the radius for each neighborhood
because there may be workers who are located exactly on the boundary for both the
reference group of interest and the adjacent reference group.9 We construct hours worked
by individuals in the outside ring in Figure 1, (0.2, 0.6], which has an average of 226
observations for each instrument group. First-stage goodness of fit and Sargan test results
for the regressions in Table 2 confirm that our instruments (for all three right-hand side
endogenous regressors) are valid in terms of passing the standard checks for weak
instruments and that the overidentifying restrictions are satisfied.
5.3 Sensitivity Analysis

In is instructive to examine how our results may or may not be robust to the sizes
of the reference group or adjacent groups comprising the instrument set. How might our
results change by (1) shrinking the outer circle boundary in Figure 1, which leaves the
reference group size the same but decreases the number of observations viewed as nearest
neighbors for the reference group, or change by (2) shrinking the inner reference group
circle boundary in Figure 1, which makes the reference group smaller?
In the first sensitivity experiment, as the instrument group shrinks the IV
estimated social interactions effect is similar while becoming statistically less precisely
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estimated. Our interpretation is that the instrument loses power as the size of the
instrument set shrinks.
In the second sensitivity experiment, we find that when the reference group size
shrinks the estimated social interactions effect is again basically unchanged although
statistical efficiency of the estimate again decreases. We interpret the result of the second
sensitivity experiment as indicating that the range for the reference group is well chosen
because within the group there should be a similar level of interactions, and we are just
choosing a progressively smaller and small subgroup who still interact.
Having discussed the sensitivity of our results instrument construction we now
turn our attention to the economic interpretation and policy implications of our estimated
social interactions effects in male labor supply.
5.4 Interpreting the Importance of the Estimated Social Interactions Effect

The presence of social interactions in labor supply means that individuals respond
to others’ hours worked by a non-negligible amount. A social interactions effect is
important because policy affecting the wages or another independent variable of a
subgroup will not only affect the individual but also affect others in the reference group.
We therefore focus on the direct versus the indirect effect of interdependence. In
particular, we study the consequences of interdependence for the estimated effect of
wages on labor supply, which economists use widely in welfare effect simulations of tax
reform proposals.
Taking the mean values in equation (3) and focusing on hours worked and wages,
h = αω + δ1h ⇒ h = α
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1
ω,
1 − δ1

(4)

where the quantity 1/ (1 − δ1 ) is known as the global social multiplier because it
represents the effect of social interactions at the highest level of aggregation (Glaeser et
al. 2003). The total effect of a wage change can be decomposed into

∂h / ∂ω =

α
αδ1
=α +
,
1 − δ1
1 − δ1

(5)

where α is the exogenous effect, and (αδ1 ) / (1 − δ1 ) is the endogenous effect. Notice that
the endogenous effect depends on both the magnitude of the initial exogenous change and
the social multiplier.
Multiplying equation (5) by ω / h the uncompensated elasticity is

ηhw,total = η hw, exogenous + ηhw, endogenous ,

(6)

where η hw, exogenous = αω / h and η hw, endogenous = αδ1ω / (1 − δ1 ) h . For δ1 < 0.5 the exogenous
effect is larger than the endogenous effect, but for δ1 > 0.5 the endogenous effect is
larger. As we will later emphasize, the decomposition in (6) underscores how ignoring
labor supply interdependencies may have serious consequences for the elasticity
estimates of interest.
Using the values from column two of Table 2, the total uncompensated wage
elasticity of labor supply at the means is 0.22, with an exogenous part of 0.08, and a
endogenous part of 0.14. In comparison, the baseline model results from column one of
Table 2 are an uncompensated net wage elasticity of 0.13. When we purposely ignore
social interactions the estimated exogenous wage effect is about 60 percent too high; the
positive bias in the canonical model happens because the single (wage) coefficient
estimate also imbeds the effect of labor supply interdependencies. The twin findings that
(1) the wage elasticity has two unequal and sizeable parts in the social interactions model
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and that (2) the wage coefficient of the traditional model has sizeable omitted variable
bias have important consequences for evaluating tax policy.
5.5 Implications for Tax Policy Calculations

Theoretical solutions to optimal static or dynamic taxation in the presence of
social interactions externalities use the parameters of the utility and attendant
consumption and labor supply functions (Kooreman and Schoonbeek 2004, Abel 2005).
Our research clarifies the econometric subtleties of implementing labor supply models
with spillover effects and then presents econometric estimates of the importance of social
interactions in labor supply. Our most basic results are that U.S. male labor supply data
(1) reject a model ignoring social interactions against one with spillovers and (2) reject a
model with spillovers treated as exogenous against one with spillovers treated as
endogenous. A regression model that ignores spillovers in labor supply underestimates
the wage elasticity of labor supply by about 40 percent; if one uses a social interactions
model but ignores endogenous interactions one underestimates the wage elasticity by
over 60 percent.
It is less obvious how we should apply estimates that let the policy-maker
apportion the total wage elasticity into segments with and without social interactions.
Some back-of-the-envelope calculations for the proportional tax rate case are instructive.
Results from the preferred model in Table 2, column 2, are that a 10 percent
comprehensive tax rate cut would raise male labor supply by as much as 2.2 percent
when social interactions are considered; ignoring social interactions would lead to about a
60 percent under-estimate of the labor supply effect of the tax cut (0.8 percent). Less well
established is how to use in policy calculations our decomposition of the total wage
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elasticity into its exogenous component (+0.08) and its endogenous social interactions
component (+0.14).
To flesh out the enriched implications of a labor supply model with social
interactions let us consider some of the details of a proportional tax reduction applied to
married men in a case where one need be careful with potential social interactions effects.
Suppose the proportional tax rate change applied only to families with disabled children.
The subpopulation affected would be relatively small and scattered geographically; the
reference group effects could be ignored safely, and the appropriate elasticity to use
would be closer to 0.08 than to 0.22. Alternatively, suppose we were discussing the effect
of a proportional state income tax change on the highest earners in a state such as
California, where many would live in the same area. Now feedback effects would be
present. The elasticity to use would then include non-negligible social interactions effects
and would probably be closer to 0.22 than to 0.08.
The importance of gauging what is the correct elasticity in terms of the exogenous
and endogenous parts is only useful if we can define whether or not a particular group
will be affected by interactions. If the persons who are affected do not belong to the same
reference group then most likely we would only observe the exogenous effect, and the
elasticity would overestimated if we used an elasticity that contained both exogenous and
endogenous components, which was the first example in the last paragraph. If the tax
reform applied to members of a reference group, though, then there would be a fullblown feedback effect and the elasticity that used only an exogenous component would
underestimate the total labor supply effect, which was the second example above.
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6. Conclusion
Our research uses the canonical model of labor supply that adds possible social
interactions in hours worked. We flesh out the econometric nuances of testing whether an
increase in hours worked by the members of the reference group increases hours worked
for the individual (endogenous social effect). The reference group here contains persons
in close economic distance to each other. Our measure of economic distance uses factor
analysis, which allows mapping neighborhood variables into a two-dimensional social
space. Our identification strategy builds on the likelihood that some persons belong to
more than one reference group so that their hours worked may be used to instrument for
endogenous labor supply of individuals in the worker’s reference group.
In our regression model of married men’s labor supply if social interactions are
treated as exogenous there is no estimated effect of the reference group behavior on the
individual worker's behavior. When we instrument mean hours worked of the reference
group we find a social interactions effect that is significant both statistically and
economically. The estimated total wage elasticity of labor is 0.22, where about one-third
is due to the exogenous wage change and two-thirds is due to social interactions effects.
The policy implications are that if one is to understand fully the labor supply and
welfare effects of income taxes, which may be conditioned on demographic and location
information, a model including social interactions is best. Equally important is a proper
interpretation of the social interactions model results. We demonstrate how a misspecified model or a properly specified model that is mis-interpreted can easily lead to
mis-estimates of the labor supply effects of tax reform by as much as 60 percent.
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Endnotes
1.

The baseline level of social disutility s0 is exogenous, and we begin by assuming
that it is constant for all individuals across all groups. Homogeneity is important
because if s0 varies either across individuals due to heterogeneity or across the
groups due to reference-group specific characteristics, then it is impossible to
discuss the effect of social utility b ( • ) versus the effect of autonomous social
utility s0 .

2.

The overall result here would not change if s ′′ < 0 .

3.

υ = [NLI + (τ – (TT/(TI – NLI)) × (TI – NLI))], where NLI is non-labor income,
TT are total taxes, and TI is taxable income (Ziliak and Kniesner 1999).

4.

A strategy similar to ours just described is in Case and Katz (1992), who
instrument for the endogenous effect using the average levels of adjacent
neighbors’ characteristics that are supposedly exogenous. Similarly, Evans et al.
(1992) instrument school composition with city-wide variables for the
unemployment rate.

5.

The difference between the number of observations used by MaCurdy et al.
(1990) and our study comes from the fact that we dropped two observations
because the head’s age was missing and that we did not exclude persons who
were self-employed and farmers in 1975 but not in 1976 (changed employment
status). Due to restricting the sample to individuals who also reported hours
worked for year 1974, we have a final sample of 910 men.

6.

The first factor loads primarily on demographics and explains about 75 percent of
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the total variation in the variables. The second (rotated) factor loads primarily on
location and then explains about 15 percent of the information.
7.

The intuition behind the result is that as the size of the group used to produce the
average grows it approaches a similar value for everyone and become
increasingly collinear with the regression constant term.

8.

The coefficient on the hours worked for the reference group needs to be less than
1.0 here. Otherwise, a one hour increase in the mean hours worked for the
reference group would induce a worker to increase his labor supply by more than
one hour, which in turn would increase the hours worked for other men in the
individual's reference group even further. The labor market equilibrium would be
explosive, and a small positive shock to hours worked for any individual in the
reference group would cause a domino effect where in the limit all workers
choose the maximum feasible hours.

9.

The result stems from symmetric boundaries around each member. We thank Dan
Black for that observation.
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Table 1. Selection of the Reference Group Using IV Regression

AfterTaxWage
VirtualInc
AnnHSRG_0_1
AnnHSRG_0_2
AnnHSRG_0_3

(1)
AnnualHours
52.5361
(36.3663)
−0.0034
(0.0059)
−0.1978**
(0.0867)

(2)
AnnualHours
68.4734*
(35.9633)
−0.0031
(0.0058)

(3)
AnnualHours
71.6107**
(35.4610)
−0.0040
(0.0058)

(4)
AnnualHours
71.8010**
(35.8352)
−0.0047
(0.0057)

(5)
AnnualHours
68.8683*
(35.6676)
−0.0051
(0.0057)

(6)
AnnualHours
68.9533*
(35.4563)
−0.0055
(0.0057)

0.0626
(0.1432)
−0.2042
(0.2411)

AnnHSRG_0_4

−0.4982
(0.3231)

AnnHSRG_0_5

−0.9685***
(0.3566)

AnnHSRG_0_6
Observations
879
910
918
922
Average obs in
13.33
44.53
89.19
142.56
ref group
Identifying
WageRate75,
WageRate75,
WageRate75,
WageRate75,
Instruments
NLIncome75
NLIncome75
NLIncome75
NLIncome75
Standard errors in parentheses
Endogenous variables’ coefficients in bold. Weak instrument check statistics appear in Table 2.
Additional Control Variables: KIDSU6, FAMSIZ, AGE45, HOUSEQ, BHLTH, Constant
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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922

−1.5021***
(0.4709)
922

204.13

271.21

WageRate75,
NLIncome75

WageRate75,
NLIncome75
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Table 2. IV Regressions with Social Interactions
Dependent Var:
Annual Hours
Worked
AfterTaxWage
VirtualInc
IndVRG_0_2

(1)
Baseline

(2)
Full

66.6982*
(35.5604)
−0.0031
(0.0058)
−318.8201
(381.9788)

38.5373
(28.6798)
0.0000
(0.0047)
−317.4740
(307.9343)
0.6379**
(0.2689)
910
0.212
0.645
WageRate75
NLIncome75
AnnHSORG_2_6
IndVORG_2_6

AnnHSRG_0_2
Observations
Sargan test
P-value
Identifying
Instruments

910
WageRate75
NLIncome75

(3)
Only
heterogeneity
30.5734
(28.1246)
0.0011
(0.0045)
−284.0008
(302.0874)
910
WageRate75
NLIncome75

(4)
Only social
interactions
81.6429**
(37.3766)
−0.0055
(0.0061)
−385.0609
(401.1535)
1.3128***
(0.3532)
910
0.081
0.776
WageRate75
NLIncome75
AnnHSORG_2_6
IndVORG_2_6

Standard errors in parentheses
Endogenous variables’ coefficients in bold. F(Shea partial R2) = 53.0(0.189), 368.1(0.621), 51.9(0.188)
Additional control variables in all equation: KIDSU6, FAMSIZ, AGE45, HOUSEQ, BHLTH, Constant
Additional control variable in (2) and (3): AnnualHours75
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Social Coordinate 2

Figure 1. Demonstration of the Identification Strategy for the Endogenous Social Interactions.

Boundary for
reference group g2

Boundary for
reference group g1
0

h g1

1

h g1
h3g2

2

h g1g2
Inner Boundary for
instrument group
Outer boundary for
instrument group
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Appendix A. Descriptive Statistics
Variable
AnnualHours
AnnualHour75
AfterTaxWage
WageRate
WageRate75
VirtualInc
NLIncome
NLIncome75
AnnHSRG_0_2
AnnHSORG_2_6
IndVORG_2_6
IndVRG_0_2
KIDSU6
FAMSIZ
AGE45
HOUSEQ
BHLTH

Observations
910
910
910
910
910
910
910
910
910
910
910
910
910
910
910
910
910

Mean
2236.864000
2247.385000
4.692693
6.272303
5.479915
5138.557000
3710.268000
3298.155000
2210.108000
2214.600000
301892.000000
352303.000000
0.445055
3.873626
1.748352
18511.900000
.051648

Standard
Deviation
536.701100
540.086500
1.198573
1.794132
0.636453
4364.210000
4700.172000
3984.506000
134.322300
53.725650
5444115.000000
0.035230
0.696331
3.873626
3.108485
16930.990000
.221438
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Minimum

Maximum

288.000000
320.000000
0.542700
0.670000
3.655642
−965.000000
−7900.000000
−10000.000000
1180.000000
2009.458000
−1.534880
−1.760330
0.000000
2.000000
0.000000
−5000.000000
0.000000

4917.000000
4500.000000
7.488000
9.900000
6.837162
45593.000000
57640.000000
26000.000000
2950.667000
2477.579000
1.369547
1.598270
3.000000
9.000000
11.000000
120000.000000
1.000000
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